Abstract. In this paper, we use the logic of partial information to re-examine some early analyses of vague quantifiers in French such as quelques, peu, beaucoup that are found in particular in the work of O. Ducrot [2]. Our approach is based on the paradigm offered by the logical formalization of the sorites paradox. We claim that this paradox offers a general scheme along which the argumentation structure of all vague quantifiers in French may be expressed. We offer a variational principle approximating Grice's maxims in the case of vague quantification.
Introduction
Most natural language quantifiers are vague. In this paper we are interested in vague quantification in the French language, although our methods may be generalized to other languages. In French, some examples of vague quantifiers are given by beaucoup, peu, la plupart, quelques, pas tous, etc. They all express partial information, and as such, their adequate treatment falls under the scope of a logic of partial information [4] . Such a logic should allow the correct inferences expected from linguistic usage to be drawn formally. These inferences are of more than one kind. For example, from il a lu quelques romans de Balzac
(he has read some novels of Balzac) one should be able to trivially infer:
il a lu au moins un roman de Balzac
(he has read at least one novel of Balzac.) Such a consequence literally follows from the sentence uttered: we shall say that it is "hard" consequence of the sentence in the sense that it is impossible to question such a consequence, once the statement of the sentence from which it follows has been accepted. But one should also be able to deduce (first pointed out by [3] , see also 
The latter inference, however, does not have the same "firmness" as (2), as later in the discourse one may find a retraction such as il les a même tous lus
(he has even read all of them.) According to [2] , and in a manner that we feel is similar, one should be able to infer:
(he knows a bit about Balzac.) This situation differs from sentence il n'a pas lu tous les romans de Balzac
(he has not read all of Balzac novels) which, although apparently inducing that the person under consideration has read more novels that the one spoken about in (1) 
(he has read some of Balzac novels, still he does have some knowledge of Balzac.) In contrast, it must be noted that it is impossible to write * il a lu quelques romans de Balzac, pourtant (ou même, etc.) il n'en a lu aucun.
(he has read some of Balzac novels, still (or even, etc.) he has read none.) This means that the conclusions drawn in (3) and (6) do not have the same status as those drawn in (2). Such defeasible conclusions will be called weak. The aim of the logic of Partial Information is to provide an account of both hard and weak inference types. In that sense we think its application to the issue of scalar implicatures is legitimate.
